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  The protection of identity of participants in medical 
research has traditionally been guaranteed by the main-
tenance of the confidentiality of health information 
through mechanisms such as only releasing data in an 
aggregated form or after identifying variables have been 
removed. This protection of privacy is regarded as a fun-
damental principle of research ethics, through which the 
support of research participants and the public is main-
tained. Whilst this traditional model was adopted for ge-
netics and genomics research, and was generally consid-
ered broadly fit for purpose, various authors in the past 
few years have begun to question the effectiveness of the 
privacy protections in the genomic research context
  [1–6] . In 2008, the Wellcome Trust and the NIH removed 
open web access to genomic datasets after it was dem-
onstrated that individuals could be re-identified from 
  aggregated data on genome-wide association studies and 
that therefore the removal of identifying variables or the 
publishing of aggregate data alone were insufficient to 
protect the privacy of research participants   [7–9] .
    Currently, in most areas of medical research the focus 
of privacy risk assessments tends to be on making the 
data non-identifiable, without extensive consideration of 
the existence of other datasets and resources and how 
they might increase the likelihood of identification. We 
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 Abstract 
 The protection of identity of participants in medical research 
has traditionally been guaranteed by the maintenance of the 
confidentiality of health information through mechanisms 
such as only releasing data in an aggregated form or after 
identifying variables have been removed. This protection of 
privacy is regarded as a fundamental principle of research 
ethics, through which the support of research participants 
and the public is maintained. Whilst this traditional model 
was adopted for genetics and genomics research, and was 
generally considered broadly fit for purpose, we argue that 
this approach is increasingly untenable in genomics. Privacy 
risk assessments need to have regard to the whole data en-
vironment, not merely the quality of the dataset to be re-
leased in isolation. As sources of data proliferate, issues of 
privacy protection are increasingly problematic in relation
to the release of genomic data. However, we conclude that, 
by paying careful attention to potential pitfalls, scientific 
funders and researchers can take an important part in at-
tempts to safeguard the public and ensure the continuation 
of potentially important scientific research. 
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argue that this approach is increasingly untenable in ge-
nomics and draw on some important concepts from the 
field of statistics. Organisations such as National Statisti-
cal Institutes (NSIs) have long adopted proactive tech-
niques to identify challenges to the privacy of individuals. 
We believe that insights from this approach to disclosure 
control hold important lessons for the field of genomics. 
Privacy risk assessments need to have regard to the whole 
data environment, not merely the quality of the dataset to 
be released in isolation. A key factor in this approach is 
the assumption of the existence of a data intruder – an 
individual intent on attacking the data for the purposes 
of reidentifying data subjects   [10]  . Statistical datasets re-
leased by NSIs are submitted to rigorous tests to examine 
the possibilities open to a data intruder for successfully 
identifying participants. We believe that this approach 
could be usefully employed when conducting a privacy 
risk assessment in the field of genomics. In this paper we 
will discuss the application of the data environment and 
data intruder concepts to genomics research and reflect 
on implications for governance in this field   [5, 11] .
  The  Data  Environment 
 The assessment of disclosure risks and the potential to 
identify individuals should be based on an understand-
ing of the type of information that is available in the data 
environment – the parameters of available data. (The 
concept of the data environment is employed in a similar 
way by the Data Environment Analysis Service based at 
Manchester University). Consideration of the data envi-
ronment allows a systematic approach to the identifica-
tion of sources beyond a given dataset and how they 
might enable reidentification of individuals in the origi-
nal dataset.     The data environment is therefore a useful 
concept if one is trying to move away from the practice of 
considering the risks of reidentification relating to the 
release of one dataset in isolation   [10].   The rationale un-
derlying this work in the field of disclosure control is that 
taking only the quality of released data into account is not 
enough to protect the privacy of data subjects, as it fails 
to acknowledge the usefulness of other available datasets 
for the purposes of reidentification of an individual. This 
resonates with recent challenges to privacy in genomic 
research, which relate not only to the possibility of iden-
tifying participants directly from available data but also 
to the identification of participants     indirectly, by using 
data available from other sources. This challenge is not 
new, nor is it specific to genomics; the challenges to ano-
nymity posed by potential inference from other datasets 
have long been debated with regard to the management 
and reuse of large statistical datasets, such as those re-
leased by NSIs   [1, 2]  . However, particular features of ge-
nomics, including the proliferation of high resolution ge-
nomic data and data sharing policies coupled with im-
portant recent developments in technology, are important 
factors to consider alongside the concept of the data en-
vironment.
    Homer et al. used a process of comparing 3 datasets, 
‘the complex DNA mixture’, ‘a reference population’ and 
the ‘individual’s genotype’ to identify an individual in the 
data   [7]  . Here the data environment for the release of the 
anonymised datasets discussed in these papers included 
what was described by Homer et al. as the reference pop-
ulation. Genomic data is very high resolution and there-
fore is more likely than socio-economic data to provide a 
combination of traits that are individually unique. It is 
estimated that 75 – 100 single nucleotide polymorphisms 
or fewer than 20 microsatellite markers can unambigu-
ously identify a single individual   [12] .
    Genomic sequence data is being generated at an ever 
increasing rate. Research projects all over the world are 
generating genomic data by genotyping or sequencing 
the genome of their participants. This is happening not 
only in the research community but also in the private 
sector; sequence data is now being generated by a number 
of private companies who offer direct to consumer ge-
netic testing and, in some cases, feed back raw sequence 
data as well as their interpretation of it   [13] .  Another 
source of data which has an impact on risks posed by the 
data environment for the release of genomic data is that 
produced by ancestor tracing companies or held in ge-
nealogical registries   [14]  . Many people may voluntarily 
submit their DNA to sequencing companies without be-
ing aware that these provide potential reference collec-
tions. Furthermore, where archived biological research 
samples are reused for genomic research, the participant 
may be unaware that their DNA is part of a collection be-
ing used for genomic research let alone the privacy impli-
cations of its release and reuse   [5] .
    Genomic data is widely shared. Since the start of the 
Human Genome Project the importance of the sharing of 
sequence data for the advancement of science has been 
stressed by both funding bodies and influential scientists 
alike   [15, 16]  . On this basis, a number of projects have 
been established with the explicit aim of generating data 
that could be used by the scientific community as virtual 
reference libraries. Examples of projects that followed the 
open access model, which had proved so successful in the   Privacy and Genomic Data  Public Health Genomics 2011;14:17–25 19
Human Genome Project, are the HapMap project and 
more recently the 1000 Genomes Project.
    Even though some restrictions on access to data with-
in genomics remain, there is a movement towards releas-
ing more data and even unlocking data sources which 
were previously available only in more restricted ways 
  [17]  . Initiatives such as UK Biobank will create a data 
  resource, which will be open to researchers from public 
and private sectors and which will source data from the 
National Health Service under certain circumstances. 
Funders in the USA and the UK have invested in the cre-
ation of datasets to facilitate genome-wide association 
studies. These are for instance dbGaP, the Genetic Asso-
ciation Information Network (GAIN), and the European 
Genotype Archive. Projects such as the Wellcome Trust 
Case Control Consortium source data from existing proj-
ects such as the 1958 Birth Cohort and make these avail-
able on application. Some of the data, which until the 
publication of the Homer et al. paper were believed to be 
effectively anonymised, were publicly accessible on the 
web. More sensitive information or disclosive informa-
tion were restricted and only available with the approval 
of a Data Access Committee. Now all data are subject to 
this level of control.
    The data environment also includes other publicly 
available data sources relating, for example, to socio-eco-
nomic data. Data drawn from publicly available identi-
fied datasets, such as voter registration or other forms of 
anonymised data such as census data, is also part of the 
data environment and can be used in combination with 
other data sources to reidentify individuals in specific 
data sets   [1]  . As well as census data, other data sources 
such as lifestyle databases created by supermarkets or 
data processing technologies like Geographical Informa-
tion Systems (GIS), can help in isolating smaller groups 
of individuals within a dataset and facilitate disclosure of 
identities or attributes ( traits ) . The work of disclosure 
control experts is constantly growing in sophistication to 
take account of the threats posed by new technologies 
and multiple overlapping data sources   [18]  . The internet 
plays a part here by increasing the number of available 
datasets, leading some disclosure control experts to strike 
a pessimistic note on the possibility of releasing ‘safe’ 
data: ‘it is becoming increasingly difficult to produce 
anonymous and declassified information in today’s glob-
ally networked society’   [19] .
    The fact that data are available in different places and 
at different levels of aggregation and anonymisation pro-
vides less protection for privacy than one might think in 
the face of new techniques and technologies for compar-
ing and analysing datasets. In this respect, advances in 
mathematical and statistical techniques, computational 
power and knowledge of genomics are all relevant. In a 
recent study, a combination of information from genea-
logical registries and haplotype analysis of the Y chro-
mosome collected for the HapMap project allowed the 
prediction of the surnames of a number of individuals 
held in the HapMap dataset   [14]  . Nyholt et al. describe 
how advanced computational tools, together with in-
creased knowledge of genomic structure, supported the 
inference of withheld information relating to James Wat-
son’s   ApoE   gene that had been withheld from published 
data   [20]  . Information technology, moreover, facilitates 
such comparisons, allowing individual data to be com-
pared with statistical norms in order to determine how 
different a person is from a given population, a technique 
used extensively in the private sector   [21, 22]  . This com-
parison to a statistical norm creates further data relating 
to an individual thereby adding to the information avail-
able; it could, therefore, increase the possibility of disclo-
sure of a person’s identity. Again, the possibility of com-
bining different relevant data sources coupled with cer-
tain types of expertise and data processing technologies 
facilitates the discovery of identities and characteristics 
of data subjects. Genomic data also provides information 
about family members   [23]   and other genetically related 
groups.
    What is also crucial here is the vast increase in infor-
mational power unleashed by using the method of com-
paring and inferring from available data sources. For or-
ganisations with the computational capabilities to auto-
mate at least parts of this process, there are few barriers 
to the routine inference or discovery of information relat-
ing to individuals. Technologies such as data-mining do 
exactly this and have been recognised for a number of 
years as creating challenges to privacy   [24]  . When data-
mining is used in combination with data on populations 
generated by genomic research, it has the capacity to en-
able ‘the construction of new groups (based on arbitrary 
and non-obvious patterns and statistical correlations)’ 
  [2] .
  The combination of these particular factors of the data 
environment (the type and proliferation of data, and the 
statistical and technological advances) mean that tradi-
tional ways of protecting privacy are less effective in pro-
tecting the identities of research subjects. Traditional 
methods of statistical disclosure control often involve 
modifying data, through removing information by com-
bining variables or by adding noise to the data. However, 
these techniques are often ineffective in a real world set- Heeney   /Hawkins   /de Vries   /Boddington   /
Kaye     
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ting where the combination of a number of data sets al-
lows these traditional privacy protections to be circum-
vented   [1]. 
  The  Data  Intruder 
  The notion of a data intruder should be understood 
simply as someone with a motivation to investigate the 
attributes or identity of a data subject, and who uses avail-
able information for reidentification of individuals. 
Whilst it may seem that few would have the necessary 
skills, motivation or equipment to do this, we suggest that 
the data environment of genomics in fact includes many 
people who may be so motivated, and for various reasons. 
Their reasons might include further research, forensic 
purposes or use in marketing, insurance or employment 
decisions. Their motivations need not be sinister. Not 
only are there many who are driven by curiosity concern-
ing genealogy or more widely, ancestry, but there are 
thousands with stronger motivations, including adoptees 
and donor conceived children   [25, 26]  . Many of the latter 
are, moreover, fiercely critical of current regulations, in 
various jurisdictions, that prevent them from discovering 
their genetic relatives. There is therefore a potential for 
some individuals to consider that they have rights to ac-
cess genetic information which outweigh other ethical 
considerations such as confidentiality and privacy. Given 
the large numbers of interested and involved people, it 
would be foolish to consider that none of these would be 
motivated to stretch the boundaries of what constitutes a 
legitimate search for information.
    Controlling Disclosure of Identity 
  Identification by a data intruder can arise in different 
ways from use of sources within the data environment. 
Direct identification of individuals in a single dataset of 
genomic information does not tend to occur because per-
sonal identifiers are removed in order to comply with 
data protection requirements in the relevant jurisdiction, 
which generally require that only anonymised data be re-
leased. However, in a data environment a dataset does not 
exist in isolation; datasets overlap and people and orga-
nisations have all sorts of knowledge, some of which can 
be difficult to predict. While direct identification of an 
individual from one dataset may be avoided by removing 
identifiers, indirect identification or identification via in-
ference is still (re)identification and therefore a threat to 
privacy   [2]  . As a result, identifiability is not exclusively a 
quality of the data itself but depends also on the data en-
vironment and the motivations and resources available to 
a potential data intruder in any given situation.
    The quality of the data is not unimportant and may 
have a bearing on how difficult it will be ultimately to re-
identify a data subject. One example from the disclosure 
control field is provided by datasets which contain special 
uniques, i.e. individuals (or other statistical units, such as 
a family or a household) which are unique in a popula-
tion. Statistical units may be easily identifiable because of 
the rareness of their characteristics or combinations 
thereof. The threats to anonymity posed by unique com-
binations of traits are well documented   [27] .
  An example of a special unique would be a 24-year-old 
widowed female with an unusual genetic condition living 
in a small town, who would, in most cases, easily be iden-
tifiable in a dataset unless special steps were taken to 
avoid this. Again, information about the actual real world 
small town and its inhabitants would be an essential tool 
for connecting the data subject with the real world indi-
vidual. However, the data environment for the release of 
this particular dataset includes any number of other in-
formation sources such as newspaper articles or even life-
style databases assembled by supermarkets, depending 
on who the data intruder is assumed to be and which re-
sources might be available to them. The possibility of 
identification of an individual in a given dataset contain-
ing anonymised or aggregated data seems less remote 
when one considers that no dataset exists in a vacuum 
and even a potential data intruder’s own knowledge could 
allow reidentification.
  The reidentification of individuals is not the only pos-
sible form of disclosure. Attribute disclosure is an associ-
ated type of disclosure which happens when an individ-
ual or group is known to be represented in a dataset which 
shows that everybody has a particular trait   [28] .  For  ex-
ample, a dataset could reveal that every house in a par-
ticular geographical area has 2 bathrooms. Therefore, if 
one had access to a person’s address one would know 
from the dataset whether they had 2 bathrooms. This 
process is aided by the existence of other datasets which 
provide data on the same population. When 100% or 
none of the population represented in a dataset has a giv-
en trait, it can then be inferred with certainty that a per-
son from that population does or does not have the trait.
  However, in the real world it is more likely that a data-
set shows that a large proportion of the population in 
question have the trait. Where for example 80% of a pop-
ulation has a particular trait, then an individual from this   Privacy and Genomic Data  Public Health Genomics 2011;14:17–25 21
population is very likely to have the trait. Other available 
datasets in combination with local knowledge and data 
analysis techniques such as data mining can further nar-
row the odds. Rather than having directly identified an 
individual in a dataset, a number of datasets are used to 
impute the characteristics about which knowledge is 
sought for that particular individual. The type of data 
used for this process could be genomic – Nyholt et al. 
were able to use a similar process to infer information 
about Watson’s ApoE status. If a dataset provides the in-
formation that there is for example an 80% chance that 
an individual has a particular trait, it can significantly aid 
the process of inference. Although this might not be at-
tribute disclosure in its pure form, it is useful information 
for a potential data intruder. Moreover, less than fully ac-
curate predictions about individuals in a given popula-
tion may nonetheless be used as a basis for making deci-
sions. As with non-genomic data, concerns are raised 
about the use of this type of data by insurance companies, 
employers and others for genetic discrimination if indi-
viduals in disease study cohorts are identified   [29] .
    Uses of the Results of Identification –
What Are the Risks? 
  The perennial concern for those who take part in ge-
nomics research is that their genomic information may 
be used to discriminate against them by insurers or em-
ployers   [29]  . Many genomics studies concern health con-
ditions, such as mental illnesses, to which society still at-
taches stigma. Although some jurisdictions have legisla-
tive protection against some forms of discrimination, not 
all jurisdictions provide such protection, which may, at 
any rate, be fairly limited in its scope. It is not a sufficient 
defence to claim that the information disclosed by most 
genomic data about risks for future health is not relevant 
on an individual basis. Moreover, researchers cannot as-
sume that because genomic information does not disclose 
information about an individual today that it will not do 
so in the future. As research proceeds, it is reasonable to 
assume that more will be known about genetics and se-
quence information of an individual will be more infor-
mative.
    Redlining is a process that uses profiling to exclude 
individuals from access to goods and services   [30] .  This 
process occupies a legal grey area in most jurisdictions, 
and it is, moreover, usually difficult to establish that it has 
happened   [24]  . Individuals and organisations who reuse 
data for redlining are data intruders who are not predom-
inantly concerned about accuracy with regard to indi-
viduals but rather about making a well-informed guess. 
Redlining relies on the application of non-distributive 
profiles   [31]  . This means applying a profile based on the 
traits of some of a group to all members of the group, even 
though an individual member of a group may not have 
the undesirable trait. For example, an individual could be 
excluded from an insurance policy based on the fact that 
the majority of individuals living in the same geographi-
cal area had suffered from unusually poor health. The use 
of non-distributive profiles has had detrimental conse-
quences in the form of discrimination for individuals 
where traits are strongly correlated to membership of cer-
tain racial or ethnic groups. Well-known examples con-
cern African Americans who were stigmatised in relation 
to sickle cell disease in the 1970s   [32] .  Discrimination 
against those with sickle cell trait spread to carriers who 
were sometimes denied employment and life insurance. 
Genetic information may add its weight to the converging 
of disease stigma and racial discrimination   [33] .
  As new discoveries in genomics are made public, there 
is further potential for discrimination of this kind. A 
more contemporary example concerns the Duffy antigen, 
which confers resistance to certain forms of malaria and 
is widely spread in African populations. A recent study 
also linked the Duffy antigen gene with heightened odds 
of acquiring HIV-1   [34]  . Non-transparent allocation of 
individuals to groups based on known or inferred traits 
or some combination thereof can raise issues related to 
the ability to protect one’s own interest and avoid dis-
crimination, concerns traditionally associated with pri-
vacy   [24] .
    Another potential use of genomic data is in forensics; 
the use of DNA evidence is an important tool in criminal 
investigation and can help to secure convictions. The 
most usual means of use is through matching of crime 
scene samples to profiles in a criminal DNA database, 
such as the UK Police National DNA database. These da-
tabases are usually compiled from samples taken from 
those who have been convicted of certain crimes and are 
subject to tight regulation   [35]  . Even so, the UK Police 
National DNA Database has been criticised on privacy 
and discrimination grounds. Other less tightly regulated 
collections of genomic data could also be used for reiden-
tification for forensic purposes; law enforcement agencies 
have in the past matched DNA recovered from a crime 
scene to an individual’s data in a biomedical dataset  [36–
38] .
  When DNA sequence information is freely available to 
all on the internet, it is a relatively easy matter for police  Heeney   /Hawkins   /de Vries   /Boddington   /
Kaye     
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to search these biomedical datasets for matches for their 
crime scene samples. Once a match within a particular 
biomedical dataset is made, then it seems likely that the 
individual to whom the sample belongs would be identi-
fied, through either the release of the information by the 
database managers or following a court order. It is also 
worth noting that the police already use familial identi-
fication techniques, so sample matches to family mem-
bers may be sufficient for identification   [39] .  Criminal 
profile matching does not necessarily identify only a sin-
gle individual; it may identify a pool of suspects who are 
then all contacted to see whether they could be the person 
to be convicted. As more samples are searched, more false 
positives are likely to arise. When this is coupled with the 
fact that juries are inclined to misunderstand scientific 
evidence, particularly that relating to DNA, miscarriages 
of justice may arise   [40] .
    Moreover, such uses may not be transparent; a re-
searcher could release information to police or a court 
order could be made, and the means of identification 
need not become public. Although it may be argued that 
forensic use is justified in some circumstances, as the 
costs of DNA collection and sequencing drop this ap-
proach may be used with less serious crimes and in juris-
dictions without robust protections for the rights of the 
accused. Whatever the rights and wrongs of such second-
ary uses, they certainly conflict with the original inten-
tion to create a database for genomic research purposes.
    Some jurisdictions have regulatory protections which 
are intended to stop the unauthorised use of biomedical 
datasets, for example, for forensic use. In the USA, a cer-
tificate of confidentiality is meant to prevent this type of 
use of a research dataset. However, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that these protections may not actually work 
in practice  [41].  The majority of countries lack even these 
protections.
    Recommendations for Privacy Protections 
 Although the ability to share and access data is vital to 
the progress of scientific research, we should not forget 
the implications that a lack of protection for privacy could 
have for the lives of individual citizens. A clear recom-
mendation is that it is no longer reasonable to assume that 
because data is anonymous in one data environment or 
at the present time, it will remain so in every data envi-
ronment into the future. It is also not reasonable to as-
sume that use of identification from genomic informa-
tion will be innocuous.
    Traditionally, legal frameworks, at least in liberal de-
mocracies, have sought to balance the privacy of data-
subjects with the benefits of research by relying heavily 
on anonymisation and informed consent  [4, 6] . However, 
the effectiveness of these twin tools for this purpose is 
compromised in the light of the discussion above. The 
current framework for protecting informational privacy 
assumes that the use of genomic datasets, or at least the 
resources to make use of them, would largely be restrict-
ed to the scientific research community; this is a naïve 
assumption. How the resources available to a data intrud-
er will be used in each specific situation is difficult to 
predict, however, one thing that the studies above show is 
that this can happen and will happen. The current cli-
mate for data release is rich not only in datasets but also 
in knowledge, skills and motivations. In fact, a great 
many sources of information which are related to genetic 
information are widely available   [11]  , as are the informa-
tion processing technologies needed to make sense of the 
data  [2] . Moreover, the form of potential privacy infringe-
ment, which relies on inference, lacks transparency pre-
cisely because it is indirect and carried out within spe-
cific data environments. As a result it is difficult both to 
detect and to guard against by considering only the qual-
ity of the data itself.
    We are constantly warned to keep other personal in-
formation such as our names, phone numbers and bank 
account details as private as possible, to avoid identity 
theft. If privacy is breached in this way the situation can 
still sometimes be addressed, identity theft insurance 
may be purchased, and new accounts can be set up. Indi-
viduals cannot, however, change their DNA sequence: it 
is amongst the most personal of information. In the dig-
ital age, once genomic data is publicly released, it is virtu-
ally impossible to retrieve it or to make it private again, 
or even to know who has the information or to what use 
it is being put. This is especially so where some combina-
tion of inference and identifiable data is involved.
    Restricting access to genomic data to legitimate aca-
demic researchers will go a long way towards reducing 
the privacy risks elaborated above. There could, for ex-
ample, be a system which parallels that of the UK Data 
Archive which releases more sensitive and disclosive da-
tasets only to licensed academics or researchers. Corpo-
rate entities will often be carrying out legitimate academ-
ic research in biomedical sciences, as in the social sci-
ences. However, the profit motives and commercial 
imperatives of the private sector could also give rise to 
activities that cause particular privacy concerns. We rec-
ommend that it is therefore appropriate to consider care-  Privacy and Genomic Data  Public Health Genomics 2011;14:17–25 23
fully how commercial and potentially forensic use of this 
data is to be governed.
    We conclude that privacy risk assessments carried out 
prior to the establishment of collections now need to take 
into account the resources available to potential data in-
truders in the data environment, rather than the quality 
of the data in an individual dataset in isolation. Genomic 
data collections will be long standing, and participants 
need to be protected long term, not only in the first years 
of their samples being held. The traditional focus of pri-
vacy protection in research, on consent and anonymisa-
tion, is incapable alone of addressing the concerns raised 
in this paper. Changes to the system of governance will 
help to address the concerns raised here, but a new system 
would need to take into account a broader context for pri-
vacy risks and not only the narrow confines of one project 
or the activities of the research community in isolation.
    The recent Thomas and Walport report on data shar-
ing   [42]   makes a number of recommendations regarding 
the changes to the law that should be considered in order 
to facilitate research within the UK. These include the 
establishment of safe havens for researchers and a system 
of approving and accrediting researchers. They recom-
mend looking at the governance models that have been 
developed for statistical research as a basis for thinking 
about the use of medical information in research. While 
this is welcome, currently there are no policy require-
ments within medical research to undertake such broad-
er assessments of privacy.
    Importantly, it is clear that the promises of confiden-
tiality made to participants in consent forms may need to 
be updated. It is both unrealistic and irresponsible to 
promise absolute confidentiality to participants in ge-
nomics research, where data is shared. This in turn raises 
the question of what to do about past promises in consent 
forms. Given that recontacting many thousands of par-
ticipants may not be practicable, we recommend that ro-
bust assurances of realistic levels of protection for indi-
viduals and open public discussion, perhaps relating to 
the appropriate reuse of genomic data and related data, 
would be welcome.
  The initial reaction of funders to the privacy challenge 
to which they were alerted by Homer and colleagues was 
to remove full open online access   [9]  . This was an appro-
priate initial response. Now is the right time to recon-
sider the implications of the release of genomic data for 
privacy. One response might be to accept that partici-
pants in genomic research cannot maintain their privacy; 
however, privacy risks can be properly assessed and steps 
taken to guard against them. In reality, the privacy risks 
associated with genomics research are part of a broader 
picture. Genomics researchers can only do so much to 
protect privacy. Ultimately, many of the concerns dis-
cussed above relate to matters such as insurance and em-
ployment; these concerns are really only satisfactorily ad-
dressed by appropriate legislative and governance re-
sponses, at a higher policy level, and by ensuring fair 
access to employment and healthcare.
  The costs of a failure to reflect on these issues could be 
a fundamental loss of public trust, which is likely to affect 
willingness to take part in research. Again lessons can be 
learnt from the experience of the production and use of 
official statistics. For instance, a loss of trust was thought 
to be related to a fall in participation in the 2001 UK Cen-
sus. This fall off was, moreover, not related to direct iden-
tification of individuals in datasets but rather a growing 
sense of unease among members of the public about the 
circulation and use of their data   [43, 44] .
    Participants are an essential partner in genomic re-
search, and without samples the research will not pro-
ceed. To have large numbers of individuals requesting 
that their samples be withdrawn could produce an expen-
sive, time consuming problem for researchers. As sources 
of data proliferate, issues of privacy protection are in-
creasingly problematic in relation to the release of ge-
nomic data. By paying careful attention to potential pit-
falls, scientific funders and researchers can take an im-
portant part in attempts to safeguard the public and 
ensure the continuation of potentially important scien-
tific research.
  Glossary  of  Terms 
 Anomymisation   is a process which involves removing 
identifiers from data. This can be done in a number of 
different ways, such as by eliminating variables and often 
by the removal of direct identifiers from the data. Ano-
nymisation aims to minimize the risk of identity disclo-
sure.
   Attribute   disclosure is attribution independent of iden-
tification. This form of disclosure is of concern to NSIs 
involved in tabular data release and arises from the pres-
ence of empty cells either in a released table or linkable 
set of tables after any subtraction has taken place. The 
presence of a single zero within a table means that a data 
intruder may infer from mere knowledge that an indi-
vidual is represented in the table that the individual does 
not possess the combination of attributes within the cell 
containing the zero. Heeney   /Hawkins   /de Vries   /Boddington   /
Kaye     
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   Direct identification   occurs where a person’s identity 
can be determined on the basis of the information about 
variables provided in a dataset.
    Indirect identification/disclosure by inference     occurs 
where a person can be identified not directly from one 
dataset but by a process of inference aided by other data 
sources which overlap with or explain aspects of the first 
dataset.
  A   non-distributive profile   is an information profile 
built up from statistical or aggregated data about a popu-
lation. Each person in the population will have a proba-
bility of having a constellation of traits. The profile of the 
average person this produces is not distributed in the 
same way for all members but may be applied as if it is.
   Profiling   involves collating information often derived 
from a number of resources to build profiles on individu-
als which are models that predict behaviour. These pro-
files may be used by marketers for target advertising. 
Companies may link profiles to individuals’ identities. 
   Redlining   is the practice of limiting financial or retail 
services to individuals who are part of a particular group. 
This is generally done on the basis of residents having a 
lower social status or income.
       Statistical disclosure control techniques   is the set of 
methods used to reduce the risk of disclosing information 
on individuals or organizations, usually by perturbing 
the data, or not releasing more disclosive data which 
could allow the identity of a statistical unit to be deter-
mined.
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